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Sovereign Exchange Offers in 2010
Sergio J. Galvis
Angel L. Saad*
Since the early 1990s, emerging market sovereigns have relied on the
international bond markets as an important source of foreign capital. Like other
debtors, sovereign borrowers occasionally run into trouble. Their economies
may stumble due to flawed policies and adverse conditions at home or abroad,
or they may simply borrow more than they can afford to repay. When
confronted with a liquidity crisis, sovereigns have sought to restructure their
bond debt by asking investors to exchange their existing bonds for new bonds
with more "realistic" payment terms. Amending their existing bonds has not
been a practical alternative because such an amendment would require the
unanimous consent of thousands of holders.'
More recently, sovereign bonds issued under New York law have moved
away from unanimous consent toward collective action clauses ("CACs"), which
allow the bonds' payment terms to be amended with majority bondholder
consent. This trend will not diminish the role of sovereign exchange offers as
the preferred means to restructure sovereign debt. Rather, the widespread use of
CACs will make exchange offers increasingly effective as a tool for
implementing broadly supported debt restructurings. At the same time, the case
for a sovereign bankruptcy regime-as recently proposed by the International
Monetary Fund-will seem even less compelling than it does today.2

I
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Sergio J. Galvis is a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. Angel L. Saad is a senior associate at the
firm. This essay represents the authors' personal views, and does not purport to represent the
views of Sullivan & Cromwell or its clients.
Until recently, bonds issued under the laws of New York and certain other important jurisdictions
required unanimous bondholder consent to amend their payment terms.
By the time Mexico added CACs to its international bonds in early 2003-paving the way for
other sovereigns-the IMF's proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) was
visibly running out of steam. Today, the SDRM is chiefly remembered for its effectiveness in
encouraging some reluctant investors to go along with CACs for fear of something much worse.
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This essay is organized around four basic questions about exchange offers
and the prospects for their future: When are exchange offers used? Why do they
work? How are they changing? How will they work even better in five years?
I. WHEN ARE THEY USED?
Sovereign exchange offers are used in many different circumstances, not
just when an issuer faces economic woe. There are at least three distinct
purposes for exchange offers: liability management, reprofiling, and
restructuring.
Until the late 1980s, emerging market sovereigns, particularly in Latin
America, relied on bank loans to access foreign capital. In the early 1990s, many
of these sovereigns experienced financial crises and, after protracted negotiations
with creditors, their loans were converted into freely tradeable Brady bonds.3
Some Brady bonds required issuers to maintain collateral against payment of the
bonds, which was expensive and tied up the sovereign's capital. As economic
conditions improved, and the international capital markets became more
receptive to emerging market risk, countries began using exchange offers to
swap Brady bonds for uncollateralized bonds. Since 1995, sovereigns have also
used exchange offers to consolidate smaller series of bonds into larger series,
extend the maturity profile of their external debt, and reduce their exposure to
particular currencies. The effectiveness of exchange offers for liability
management purposes is underscored by Mexico's early retirement of its last
Brady bonds in July 2003 following a number of exchange offers and bond
repurchases. 4
There is another, less positive context in which emerging market
sovereigns use exchange offers. A country in financial straits may resort to an
exchange offer as a means to reprofile or restructure its external debt.
Depending on the severity of the sovereign's troubles, bondholders may be
asked to exchange their existing bonds for new bonds with a longer maturity but
no reduction in the principal or interest payable to holders-a so-called
"reprofiling" of the issuer's debt. This type of exchange offer is intended to give
the sovereign some breathing room, and usually takes place before any default
has occurred. Uruguay completed a successful reprofiling exchange offer in May

3

4

Brady bonds are named after former US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, who brokered the
successful plan.
For a history of emerging market sovereign and corporate debt during these years, with an
analysis of the implications for investors, see Christoph Klingen, Beatrice Weder, and Jeromin

Zettelmeyer, How Private CreditorsFaredin Emerging Debt Markets, 1970-2000, IMF Working Paper
No 04/13 (2004), available online
wp0413.pdf> (visited Mar 3, 2005).

at

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/
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2003, and within five months. was again able to tap the international bond
markets to raise capital.5
In other cases, more time to pay is not enough. A country is forced to
admit that its debt burden is unsustainable and approaches bondholders with a
proposal to reduce the amount owed, or in other words, a haircut. Investors are
a rational bunch, and will be persuaded to go along only to the extent they
believe their alternatives are worse. An interesting dynamic develops between
debtor and creditor in this context, which will be explored in Part I1. For now, it
is fair to say that bondholders have been "persuaded" in the past to agree to
restructurings involving a substantial haircut. One example is Ecuador, which
succeeded in reducing the amount owed under its international bonds by
roughly 35 percent.6 And Argentina's recent exchange offer involves a debt
reduction that many investors would describe as a crew-cut.
II. WHY Do THEY WORK?
Sovereign exchange offers are not only common, they also have an
enviable track record. During various crises in emerging markets in the last five
years, every attempt by a sovereign issuer to restructure its existing bonds
through an exchange offer was successful: Pakistan, Ukraine, Ecuador, Russia
and Uruguay were each able to effect new payment terms for approximately 90
percent of their bonds.' And Argentina is on the verge of completing the largest
and most complex exchange offer in history, involving 152 distinct series of
bonds representing over 80 billion dollars of debt.8
Before exploring the reasons for this success, it is important to
acknowledge that there are other, perhaps more important factors that
determine whether and when a government is able to restructure its external
debt. First, the country must be prepared both politically and economically to

5

See Carlos Stenari, Lessonsfrom Uruguay'sAggregation Clauses (Jan 2005) (unpublished manuscript on
file with authors).

6

Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Haircuts 23 (Oct 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available online at <http://www.utdt.edu/-fsturzen/Haircuts102004.pdf> (visited
Mar 3, 2005).

7

For a discussion of these exchange offers and a current overview of issues relating to sovereign
debt restructurings, see Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial
Crisesin Emerging Economies 119-180 (Inst for Intl Econ 2004).
For a description of the terms of Argentina's exchange offer and CACs, see Republic of
Argentina, Prospectus Supplement dated January 12, 2005, Offer to Owners of Eligible Securities to

8

at
online
Securities,
available
for
New
Securities
Eligible
Exchange
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm>
(visited Mar 3, 2005). Argentina's transaction involves the consolidation of 152 existing series of
bonds into 13 new series.
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address its obligations to foreign investors in a serious way. Second, the
sovereign's proposal must be perceived by a critical mass of investors as fair and
equitable in light of its repayment capabilities and its treatment of other
creditors. An exchange offer is most likely to yield satisfactory results when
these two conditions are present.
Explanations for the effectiveness of sovereign exchange offers tend to
focus on a distressed issuer's willingness to resort to pressure tactics, including
threats of nonpayment and exit consents. The threat of nonpayment is powerful
in the case of a sovereign because, unlike a corporate debtor whose assets can be
liquidated to satisfy its creditors' claims, government issuers are effectively
"judgment-proof." Collecting a judgment against a sovereign is very difficult9
because its assets at home and abroad are usually shielded by immunity.
Consequently, bondholders trying to decide whether to accept new bonds
(which the sovereign has promised to pay) in exchange for existing bonds
(which the sovereign has promised not to pay) reject the offer at the risk of an
even greater loss.
Some exchange offers involve the use of exit consents as a further means
to increase bondholder participation. When this device is used, investors who
wish to participate in the exchange offer are required to consent to adverse
changes to the existing bonds' non-payment terms before receiving new bonds.'0
Holders feel pressure to accept the sovereign's offer for fear of being left behind
with bonds that have been adversely modified."
Threats of nonpayment and exit consents deserve a share of the credit for
the success of exchange offers. But there are other, more positive factors at play
as well.
First, the liquidity of the secondary market for most sovereign bonds
provides valuable information to issuers and their advisors as they craft a
proposal for an exchange offer.'2 In a liquid market, investors are able to enter
and exit the bonds at different price points, reflecting their assessment of the
issuer's prospects. These price signals help the sovereign identify the parameters
of a deal likely to gain widespread acceptance in the market. The success of an
exchange offer is bound to be greatest where the net present value of the terms
9
10

Obtaining a judgment against a sovereign issuer also limits the bondholder's options by restricting
its ability to sell the bonds in the market or participate in a subsequent exchange offer.
These amendments usually involve the removal or modification of important nonpayment terms,

1

such as the waiver of sovereign immunity, submission to New York courts and choice of
governing law. Standard New York bond documentation does not expressly require the issuer to
obtain unanimous consent to make changes to these nonpayment terms.
The importance of exit consents relative to other factors is sometimes exaggerated. Notably,

12

Argentina has foregone the use of exit consents in its current exchange offer.
See Sergio J. Galvis, Sovereign Debt Restructurings-TheMarket Knows Best, 6 Intl Fin 145, 151 (2003).
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of the exchange represent a premium over the market price of the existing
bonds, allowing short-term investors to exit their investment with a trading
profit.
Second, exchange offers give sovereigns and their advisors flexibility to
craft terms that address the various objectives of a diverse investor base. Issuers
usually sound out the market in advance of a proposal and, with the assistance
of experienced financial and legal advisors, design a menu that gives as many
bondholders as possible an option they can live with. For example, if a
significant number of bondholders are intent on preserving the principal amount
of their bonds, the sovereign may offer investors an option to exchange their
existing bonds on a par-for-par basis for new bonds with a longer maturity or a
lower coupon. This flexibility is also evident in the system of carrots-and-sticks
sovereigns have used in past exchange offers. Sticks were discussed earlier.
Carrots often take the form of "sweeteners," which can include anything from
straight-out cash payments to investors accepting the issuer's offer, to interest
step-up provisions rewarding holders of new bonds with a higher return if the
country's economy recovers in the future.
Third, the unilateral nature of exchange offers reduces the likelihood that
the sovereign and its investors will get bogged down in endless negotiations.
While the success of a restructuring may depend on how effectively the issuer
gauges market sentiment and persuades investors that its proposal is reasonable,
the terms of the exchange offer are set by the issuer in consultation with its
financial advisors. In the end,13 investors are presented with a carefully crafted
take-it-or-leave-it proposition.
III. How ARE THEY CHANGING?
Advocates of a recent IMF proposal to establish a Chapter 1-type
bankruptcy process for sovereign debtors focused their arguments on two
principal concerns about the current framework for debt restructurings. First,
due to the presence of thousands of bondholders among the sovereign's
creditors, it is simply not practicable for an issuer to engage in a collective
dialogue with its creditors during a liquidity crisis. Second, for the same reason, it
is impossible for an issuer to obtain unanimous consent to restructure its
payment obligations. Consequently, a vulture fund or other so-called rogue

13

This is the flipside of the concern that the absence of creditor coordination makes it difficult for a
sovereign and its bondholders to negotiate and reach an agreed proposal. For a recent and
insightful discussion of the interaction between the issuer and its bondholders, and among the
bondholders themselves, see Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, The Reform of the Sovereign Debt
RestructuringProcess: Problems, ProposedSolutions, and the Atgentine Episode, 1 J of Restructuring Fin 173
(2004).
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investor could acquire a small percentage of bonds in the open market and
sabotage
a proposal that a large majority of bondholders are prepared to
14
accept.
After a spirited debate, the IMF's proposal ran out of steam in the face of
opposition from investors, issuers and, eventually, the US Treasury. However,
many opponents of the IMF's proposal conceded that improvements to the
existing framework would be desirable. A number of G-10 officials (led by the
US Treasury), creditor associations, and lawyers perceived an opportunity to
improve the status quo by introducing CACs into sovereign bonds issued under
New York law. 5 CACs mitigate the holdout problem by allowing a qualified
majority of bondholders to amend a bond's payment terms, substantially
reducing the risk that a few holdouts in one series of bonds could forestall a
restructuring proposal.
Mexico added CACs to the terms of its bonds issued under New York law
in early 2003, and since then almost every emerging market sovereign issuing
international bonds has followed Mexico's example. A partial list includes
Uruguay, Brazil, Belize, South Africa, Indonesia, Colombia, Panama, Chile,
Venezuela, and Hungary. In a recent study, the Bank of England noted that 80
percent of sovereign bonds issued in the international bond markets in 2004
(through September) contained CACs. 6
The penetration of CACs is both wide and increasingly deep. Critics of
CACs argued that the clauses would take too long to make their way into a
sovereign's bond inventory because they could only be incorporated
prospectively in new bonds. However, as noted at the time, emerging market
countries frequently consolidate or otherwise swap out their existing bonds
through exchange offers, providing opportunities to phase in CACs more
quickly.17 For example, Brazil first adopted CACs in April 2003, and had

14

15

16

17

During this debate, advocates of the IMF's proposal were unable to persuade key participants that
agreement was any easier to reach when an issuer had to negotiate with syndicates of bank
lenders. See Roubini and Setser, Bailouts or Bail-ins? at 12 (describing as a "myth" the suggestion
that "[r]estructurings were easy and orderly in the bank-dominated 1980s") (cited in note 7).
See US Department of Treasury Under Secretary John Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:A US
Perspective, Remarks at the Institute for International Economics (Apr 2, 2002), available online at
<http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm> (visited Mar 3, 2005). For a discussion of
the emergence of CACs, including the involvement of the G-10 Working Group, see Sergio J.
Galvis and Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progressand Challenges Ahead, Geo J Intl L
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors).
See John Drage and Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses: an Analysis of Provisions
Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues 2-3 (Bank of England 2004).
See Galvis, 6 Intl Fin at 153 (cited in note 12).
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incorporated the clauses in more than one-third of its outstanding international
bonds by December 2004.8
IV. How WILL THEY WORK EVEN BETTER IN 2010?
As mentioned earlier, the success of an exchange offer depends largely on
the market's perception of the fairness of the issuer's proposal. However, the
rules of play can also make a difference in helping a motivated issuer reach its
goal. Those rules are likely to be different in 2010, as most emerging market
countries will have incorporated CACs into their international bonds. The
following discussion highlights some of the ways in which exchange offers may
play out differently-and more smoothly-in five years.
A. NEUTRALIZATION OF HOLDOUTS:
MAJORITY AMENDMENT CLAUSES
The defining feature of CACs is the majority amendment clause, which
permits holders representing 75 percent in principal amount of outstanding
bonds (or another stated percentage) to amend basic payment terms such as
payment dates, amounts due, interest rates, and currency of payment. 19
A sovereign issuer conducting an exchange offer in 2010 will be able to
invoke this clause to restructure bonds that are not tendered voluntarily, thereby
"neutralizing" holdouts. Specifically, the issuer would seek to amend the
payment terms of its existing bonds to match those of its new bonds by
requiring tendering bondholders to consent to the amendment as a condition of
participating in the exchange offer. Assuming consents are received from
bondholders representing 75 percent of principal, nontendering bondholders
and tendering bondholders would end up with identical bonds.2 ° This result
would demonstrate the issuer's commitment to fairness, while the high level of
18

See Ministry of Finance and National Treasury of Brazil, Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt
Restructurings in Emeqging Markets, Presentation at Bank of England (an 12, 2005).

19

For sovereign bonds issued under New York law, a market consensus has formed around an
approval threshold of 75 percent of outstanding principal for amendments to payment terms. The
influential International Primary Market Association recently issued standard form CACs for
sovereign bonds issued under English law that follow the New York threshold. See International
Primary Market Association, Standard Collective Action Clauses (CACs)for the Terms and Conditions of

20

Sovereign Notes, (Oct 2004), available online at <http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/
CACs%20Clauses%20Section % 20VII%2ONo%208%200ct%202004.pdf> (visited Mar 3, 2005).
However, nontendering bondholders may not receive any sweetener offered by the issuer to
tendering bondholders, and will not have had a choice as to which series of new bonds the
existing bonds are effectively "swapped" for. Uruguay's recent bonds address the second issue ex
ante by prohibiting amendments that result in terms less favorable than those of any new bonds
issued in connection with a simultaneous exchange offer.
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bondholder participation would prove the market's acceptance of the exchange
offer.2'

B. FEWER BLOCKING POSITIONS: COLLECTIVE
ACCELERATION CLAUSES

In addition to a majority amendment clause, most CACs include a
provision restricting an individual bondholder's right to accelerate the principal
due at maturity following an event of default. This provision typically requires
the consent of holders representing at least 25 percent of principal to accelerate
the maturity date, and authorizes holders representing 50 percent of principal to
rescind a previously declared acceleration for the entire series. Without
acceleration, holdouts are limited to suing an issuer for regularly scheduled
payments after their due date instead of the full principal, which is less likely to
justify the expense of litigation.
With similar thresholds under majority amendment and acceleration
clauses, holdouts will need
to acquire at least 25 percent
With CACs in place, holdouts could not prevent the restructuring of a series
of bonds unless they owned or acquired bonds representing 25 percent or
of principal to establish a
more of the outstanding principal of that series. In recent years, sovereign
blocking
position
from
issuers have tended to issue bonds in large series, making it more expensive
for holdouts to acquire such a blocking position. The following table shows,
which to interfere with an
the total number of US dollar-denominated global bonds issued by five
exchange offer. As a result,
active sovereign issuers over a five-year period, with a breakdown by range

this

strategy

may

prove

expensive in some cases.
Even where the bonds trade
at a discount to par,
acquiring a blocking position
would require a substantial
investment of capital unless
the series targeted by the
holdout is very small (and
thus insignificant). Vulture
funds may not always be
keen to put that much

21

of issue size.

US Dollar-Denominated Global
Bond Issuances
anuary 1, 2000 to December 31, 2004
Between

US$500
Sovereign
Issuer
Brazil

Less
than
US$500
million

Colombia

million
and
US$1
billion
4

US$1
billion or
more
16

Total
number
of
issuances
20

9

1

10

Panama

4

3

Mexico

-

6

17

23

2

1

5

8

Venezuela

7

The sovereign could further evidence market acceptance by announcing a minimum level of
bondholder participation in the exchange offer, below which the issuer would admit defeat and
the transaction would not move forward. Ideally, the minimum condition would be set at the
same level as the issuer's majority amendment clause, although the former is usually based on the
participation rate of bondholders in the exchange offer as a whole while the latter is typically
based on the participation rate of bondholders of individual series.
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capital at risk given the well-known difficulty of collecting judgments against
sovereigns.
C. LESS LITIGATION AND FREE RIDING: COLLECTIVE
LITIGATION CLAUSES
Beyond measures that reduce a holdout's incentive to sue the issuer, an
outright ban on litigation by individual bondholders is also possible. One
approach to this model involves migration from a fiscal agency structure to a
22
trustee structure, as Uruguay has done and Argentina now proposes to do.
Under a typical trust indenture, no bondholder is permitted to sue the issuer
unless holders representing 25 percent of principal have requested the trustee to
commence litigation and the trustee has failed to act on this request for 60 days.
It is worth noting that similar provisions could be used under an existing fiscal
23
agency structure if a sovereign was not inclined to move to a trustee structure.
Collective litigation clauses preclude individual holdouts from using
litigation as a tactic to disrupt an exchange offer or "free riding" on other
creditors' debt forgiveness by sing for the full amount. A ban on litigation can
prove invaluable while a sovereign develops and implements a broadly
acceptable restructuring proposal. Notably, Uruguay and Argentina have limited
the effectiveness of this device somewhat by including an exception for suits
brought by individual bondholders to collect past due amounts (but not
accelerated principal).24 Subject to market acceptance, this exception could be
omitted by a sovereign to further reduce the risk of disruptive litigation.
D. REDUCED VULNERABILITY OF SMALLER SERIES:
AGGREGATED VOTING
Uruguay's bonds allow it to amend payment terms across multiple series of
bonds with the consent of holders representing 66% percent of principal of each
series (as opposed to 75 percent) if the same amendment is approved by at least
85 percent of principal of all affected series. Argentina has included a similar
provision in the bonds offered in its recent exchange offer.

22

23

24

Traditionally, sovereigns have used fiscal agents instead of trustees under their international
bonds. Fiscal agents are mere payment agents of the issuer, while trustees act as a fiduciary of
bondholders.
For example, the fiscal agency agreement or the terms of the bonds themselves could provide that
no holder is permitted to sue the issuer unless holders representing 25 percent of principal have
consented in writing to such a lawsuit.
This exception is specifically required to be included in corporate bonds offered publicly in the
United States under the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939, but is not required in sovereign bonds.
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Lowering the per-series threshold needed to amend the bonds' payment
terms reduces the risk that a holdout will circumvent CACs by acquiring a
blocking position in a smaller series of bonds. For example, under Uruguay's
CACs, holdouts would need to own 33V percent of principal of an individual
series (or 15 percent of principal of all series) to block a restructuring proposal.
One article notes that, had Uruguay's existing bonds contained the same
majority amendment and aggregated voting clauses as its new bonds, its
exchange offer in 2003 would have succeeded in restructuring 95.9 percent of its
existing bonds instead of 88.9 percent.25
While aggregated voting can be helpful in some circumstances, it is worth
making two observations. First, raising the bar from 25 percent to 33V percent
is unlikely to make a significant difference unless the issuer has one or more
small series of bonds in which a potential holdout would be able and willing to
purchase even a 25 percent stake. As noted above, in recent years, sovereign
issuers have tended to issue fewer, larger series of bonds in order to satisfy
investors' preference for liquidity, sometimes "re-opening" an existing series to
increase the size instead of issuing a new series.
Second, aggregated voting is not the same as aggregation. Uruguay's
innovation is a conditional reduction of the approval threshold for amendments
to individual series of bonds from 75 percent to 66 percent. By analogy to
corporate bankruptcy law, true aggregation would occur if bondholders (along
with other creditors) were arranged for negotiating and voting purposes into
classes with common interests based on the substantive characteristics of their
credit.2 6 The rules for class divisions would need to be established ex ante,
possibly in a master debt agreement incorporated into all of the sovereign's
medium and long term indebtedness regardless of form or governing law. It
would take time to establish sensible divisions, but possibilities include
separating bondholders and other creditors based on the remaining time to
maturity of their competing claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

Sovereign debt workouts usually arise in the face of economic distress, and
a comprehensive debt restructuring will inevitably involve considerable time and
effort. When the country's government is ready to face its creditors, however,
exchange offers are a useful tool that mitigates many of the concerns raised by
commentators about the prospects for orderly debt restructurings. Their track

25
26

See Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, Uruguay's Innovaions, 19 J Intl Bank L & Rev 28, 31
(2004).
See Galvis, 6 Intl Fin at 154 (cited in note 12).
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record since emerging market countries began using them more than ten years
ago tends to contradict claims that the "financial architecture" for restructurings
is fundamentally flawed. Moreover, with the spread of CACs, the outlook for
successful exchange offers in 2010 looks even more promising.
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